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Abstract
This paper analyses a model of price formation in a market with a finite number of
non-identical agents engaging in decentralised bilateral interactions. We focus mainly
on equal numbers of buyers and sellers, though we discuss other cases. All character-
istics of agents are assumed to be common knowledge. Buyers simultaneously make
targeted offers, which sellers can accept or reject. Acceptance leads to a pair exiting
and rejection leads to the next period. Offers can be public, private or “ex ante public”
. As the discount factor goes to 1, the price in all transactions converges to the same
value.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study price formation in a market with small numbers of buyers and sellers,
where transactions are bilateral between a single buyer and a single seller. For a broad range
of variants of a dynamic bargaining game with many sellers and buyers, in which only one
side of the market makes offers, we find that, as the discount factor goes to 1, there is a
stationary equilibrium where prices in different transactions converge to a single value.
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1.1 Motivation for the problem studied
Most modern markets consist of a small number of participants on each side. These partici-
pants buy from and sell to each other, write contracts with each other and sometimes merge
with each other. The transactions in these markets are often bilateral in nature, consisting
of an agreement between a buyer and a seller or a firm and a worker. These bilateral trades
occur without any centralised pricing mechanism, in a series of bargains in which the “out-
side options” for a current bargaining pair are, in fact, endogenously given for each by the
presence of alternative partners on the other side of the market. However, these potential
alternative partners, by their presence, implicitly compete with each other and one question
that arises naturally is whether the “competitive” pressure of the outside options leads to
an approximately uniform price for non-differentiated goods. It is this basic question, about
endogenous outside options and a uniform price, that this paper seeks to study. We focus
on complete information. 1
1.1.1 Examples
Whilst the models we study are going to be highly stylised representations of these examples,
they at least have some features in common with them. A standard example used in these
settings is the housing market, for a given location and a given type of home (to reduce the
extent of differentiation). Sellers list their houses, buyers visit, inspect and then convey their
offers to the sellers-one offer from each buyer. Sellers can accept or reject the offers they have;
possibly they then make counter-offers or often wait for the buyer to come back again with
new higher offers. Whether counter-offers are made or not distinguishes different extensive
forms or bargaining protocols. The offers are privately made to sellers, who typically do not
know what other sellers receive.
Another example is of a firm being acquired. Here the potential acquirer makes a public
targeted offer for a particular firm, which the shareholders of the potential acquisition have
to accept or reject (based on a recommendation by the management). A rejection could lead
to the acquirer raising its offer. There could be competition on both sides, perhaps from
another potential buyer called in by management of the target as a “white knight” and other
possible targets with the same attractive characteristics as the one in play. In this particular
context, it makes sense to think of offers as being one-sided, from the potential buyers, and
publicly announced.
Private targeted offers occur in negotiations for joint ventures. For example, the book [1]
describes the joint venture talks between industrial gas companies and chemical companies
1An incomplete information analysis has been done in a companion paper [4].
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in the 1980s, in which the players were Air Products, Air Liquide and British Oxygen on
one side and DuPont, Dow Chemical and Monsanto on the other. After some bargaining,
two joint ventures and an acquisition resulted.
1.2 Main features of our model
Our model begins from a setting of two buyers with common valuation v, two sellers with
valuations M,H and complete information about these values. We assume that v > H >
M > 0. We then extend the model by adding both buyers, sellers to the basic model. There
is a one-time entry of players, at the beginning of the game, and a buyer-seller pair who
trade leave the market.
Players discount with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). We consider equilibria for high
values of δ and consider the limit of equilibria as δ → 1. The extensive forms we consider
have two main features; offers are one-sided and offers are simultaneous. Simultaneous offers
seems to us to be the right way to capture the essence of competition. Targeting an offer to
one individual on the other side of the market enables us to endogenise matching between
buyers and sellers as a strategic decision. Once the offers have been made, one per proposer,
recipients simultaneously accept or reject. A rejection ensures that the game continues to
the following period, where payoffs are discounted by δ.
Our main results, starting with the basic model, can be simply described. There is a
unique stationary equilibrium outcome under complete information, involving non-degenerate
mixed strategies for all players. As δ → 1, the mixed strategies collapse to a single price
and the price in all matches goes to H. In equilibrium, there could be one-period delay with
positive probability, but the cost of delay, of course, goes to 0 as δ → 1. The price H might
be thought of as a competitive equilibrium price in the complete information setting. (Given
our assumptions, any price between v and H will equate supply and demand.)
For the general n buyer-n seller case, we show the uniqueness of the limiting payoff
for buyers and the convergence of prices in all transactions to a single value as δ → 1,
for any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (Theorem 1). The main equilibrium
characterisation result for the general case is given in Theorem 2, which builds on the
analysis preceding it in the paper. .
In the next sub-section, we discuss the relevant literature and compare our results to
some of the existing work.
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1.3 Related literature.
We now qualitatively describe the existing literature and compare our model with it. The first
attempts to obtain micro foundations for markets using bilateral bargaining were the papers
by Rubinstein and Wolinsky [15], [3] Gale [8] and [9], . These papers were all concerned
with large anonymous markets, in which players who did not agree in a given period are
randomly and exogenously rematched in succeeding periods with someone they had never
met before. Rubinstein and Wolinsky [15] and Gale [9] consider bargaining frictions given by
discounting and characterise the limiting price as the discount factor goes to 1. The limiting
price depends on exogenously given probabilities of being matched in the following period.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky [16] (see also [13], Chapter 9.2, 9.3 for an exposition of their
models) is the first paper to consider the issue of price determination in small markets. They
consider buyers and sellers, with the number of buyers being more than that of sellers. Each
buyer-seller pair is capable of generating a surplus of 1 unit. In their basic model with random
matching and no discounting, they construct a class of non-stationary equilibria and show
that these do not give the entire surplus to the short side of the market; however, the sta-
tionary equilibrium does. With discounting, some of their equilibrium constructions become
difficult to sustain for random matching, so they introduce a seller choosing a buyer who is
“privileged”, as in their equilibrium construction without discounting. They do not consider
equal numbers of buyers and sellers, heterogeneity in surpluses and direct competition for
the same seller by two different buyers (with discounting). Both the current paper and the
paper by Chatterjee and Dutta [5] may be viewed as extensions of the Rubinstein-Wolinsky
model to richer strategic settings.
Chatterjee and Dutta [5] attempt a project similar to this one, also with public and private
targeted offers and ex ante offers, but both sides of the market are allowed to make offers.
It turns out that this difference with the current paper is crucial. The paper [5] does not, in
general, obtain an asymptotically single price as δ → 1; under public targeted offers, there
is a pure strategy equilibrium and all pure strategy equilibria involve two different prices. In
general, the mixed strategy equilibrium with private offers remains non-degenerate even as
δ → 1, unlike this paper, even though the expected player payoffs converge. The intuition
behind these results in Chatterjee-Dutta is that there is a tension in every period between
two opposing forces acting on the price. Since the two sides of the market alternate in
making offers, a single rejection in a period (in the game with two buyers and two sellers)
will generate a “Rubinstein bargaining subgame”. In the presence of heterogeneous agents,
this leads to pressure on the prices to diverge towards the two different bargaining solutions.
However, there is also competition in each period to try to match with the player who offers a
higher surplus because of simultaneity of offers and, therefore, undercutting or overbidding.
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This conflict is impossible to resolve with two agreements taking place in the same period
but there is a pure strategy equilibrium with agreement taking place in different periods
at different prices. The current paper keeps the aspect of competition but eliminates the
complication caused by the two sides of the market making alternating offers. This explains
why one sided offers leads to unique stationary equilibrium with competitive price in the
limit as players get patient.
Gale and Sabourian [11] and Sabourian [17] use notions of strategic complexity to select
the competitive equilibrium in games of the kind studied by Rubinstein and Wolinsky.
Hendon and Tranaes [12], also following Rubinstein and Wolinsky [16] study a market
with two heterogeneous buyers and one seller, and random matching after initial disagree-
ment.
To summarise, this current paper differs from the existing literature by con-
sidering one or more of the following: (i) Small numbers and strategic matching. (ii)
Extensive forms with different assumptions about whether offers are public or targeted and
private. (iii) Simultaneous offers. Despite this variety and the number of differences with the
papers mentioned above, the results we get are surprisingly consistent with an asymptotic
single price. It is clear that the fact that we consider one-sided rather than alternating offers
has much to do with this, and this might be considered one of the takeaways from this paper,
namely that the intuition for the single price result holds broadly provided alternating offers
don’t push prices apart when buyer-seller valuations are heterogeneous.
In the next section, we discuss the basic model with two buyers and two sellers under
complete information. In Section 3, we analyse the general case where there are n buyers
and n sellers, for general finite n and obtain similar results on the asymptotic buyer payoffs
being the same. In section 4 we consider possible extensions.
2 The Basic Framework
2.1 The model
2.1.1 Players and payoffs
In the basic model we address, there are two buyers and two sellers. As mentioned in Section
1.2, there are two buyers B1 and B2 with a common valuation of v for the good (the maximum
this buyer is willing to pay for a unit of the indivisible good). There are two sellers. Each
of the sellers owns one unit of the indivisible good. Sellers differ in their valuations (we can
also interpret these as their costs of producing to order). One of the sellers, (SM) has a value
of M for one or more units of the good. The other seller, (SH) similarly has a value of H
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where
v > H > M > 0
This inequality implies that either buyer has a positive benefit from trade with either
seller. Alternative assumptions can be easily accommodated but are not discussed in this
paper. In the basic complete information framework all these valuations are commonly
known. Finally, all players are risk neutral. Players (buyers or sellers) have a common
discount factor δ where δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose a buyer agrees on a price p with seller Sj in
period t. Then the buyer has an expected discounted payoff of δt−1(v − p) and Sj has the
payoff of δt−1(p− j), where j = M,H.
We shall discuss the informational assumptions along with the extensive forms in the
next subsection.
2.1.2 The extensive form
We consider an infinite horizon multi-player bargaining game with one-sided offers. The
extensive form of the game is described as follows.
At each time point t = 1, 2, ... offers are made simultaneously by the buyers. The offers
are targeted. This means an offer by a buyer consists of a seller’s name (that is SH or SM
) and a price at which the buyer is willing to buy the object from the seller he has chosen.
Each buyer can make only one offer per period. Two settings could be considered; one in
which each seller observes all offers made (public targeted offers) and one in which each seller
observes only the offers she gets (private offers). (Similarly for buyers after the offers have
been made.) In the present section we shall focus on the first and consider the latter in a
subsequent section. A seller can accept at most one of the offers she receives. Acceptances or
rejections are simultaneous. Once an offer is accepted, the trade is concluded and the trading
pair leave the game. Leaving the game is publicly observable. The remaining players proceed
to the next period in which buyers again make price offers to the sellers. As is standard in
these games, time elapses between rejections and new offers.
2.1.3 Strategies and equilibrium
We will not formally write out strategies, since this is a standard “multi-stage game with
observable actions”[7] . Since we have public targeted offers, a seller’s response (and subse-
quent actions by all players) can condition on the history of offers made to the other seller,
in addition to those she receives herself. Our equilibrium notion here will be the standard
subgame perfect equilibrium.
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2.2 Equilibrium in the basic model
2.2.1 Stationary equilibria
We consider “stationary” equilibria, that is, equilibria in which buyers when making offers
condition only on the set of players remaining in the game and the sellers, when responding,
condition on the set of players remaining and the offers made by the buyers (We emphasise
that this is not a restriction on strategies, only on the equilibria considered.). Clearly these
are particular sub-game perfect equilibria in our public targeted offers extensive form. We
shall demonstrate that the equilibrium outcome we find in this way is the unique stationary
equilibrium outcome. We shall proceed in this subsection by showing that a candidate
strategy profile, in fact, does constitute an equilibrium. In the next subsection, we shall
show that the stationary equilibrium payoff vector is unique upto choice of the buyer who
makes an offer to both sellers.
The conjectured equilibrium is as follows:
1. Consider a game in which only two players, buyer Bi and seller Sj remain in the
market and j denotes the valuation/cost of Sj. Then it is clear that (i) Bi offers j and (ii)
Sj accepts any offer at least as high as j and rejects otherwise.
2. Now consider the four-player game2. We consider the following strategies:
(a) One of the buyers, B1 say, makes offers to each seller with positive probability and
the other buyer B2 makes an offer only to SM . Let q be the probability with which B1
offers to SH . B1 offers H to SH . B1 randomises an offer to SM , using a distribution F1 (·)
with support [pl, H], where pl is to be defined later. The distribution F1(·) consists of an
absolutely continuous part from pl to H and a mass point at pl. B2 randomises by offering M
to SM(with probability q
′
) and randomising his offers in the range [pl, H] using an absolutely
continuous distribution function F2. The distributions Fi(·) are explicitly calculated later.
(b) The sellers’ strategies in the four-player game are as follows. SH accepts the highest
offer greater than or equal to H and rejects if all offers are less than H. SM accepts the
highest offer with a payoff from accepting at least as large as the expected continuation payoff
from rejecting it (which is actually determined endogenously). Throughout our analysis it
is assumed that a seller who is indifferent between accepting or rejecting an offer, always
accepts.
3. The expected payoff of a buyer Bi in equilibrium is v−H. The expected payoff of SH
is 0 and that of SM is positive.
2Note that, since we start with the same number of players on both sides of the market and since players
can leave only in pairs, any possible subgames will also have the same number of buyers and sellers.
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Proposition 1 There exists a stationary, subgame perfect equilibrium with the characteris-
tics described above.
Proof.
We break up the proof into a sequence of two lemmas, which are stated below. The
details are in the appendix.
The first lemma explicitly calculates the equilibrium Fi(.), q and q
′, given a definition of
pl. In the second lemma, we demonstrate the existence of the pl as defined.
Lemma 1 Suppose there exists a pl such that
pl −M = δ(E(y)−M)
,where y (a random variable) represents the maximum price offer to SM under the proposed
strategies. Then the strategies in 1,2 and 3 above constitute an equilibrium with
(i)
F1(s) =
(v −H)(1− δ(1− q))− q(v − s)
(1− q)[(v − s)− δ(v −H)] (1)
(ii)
F2(s) =
(v −H)(1− δ(1− q′))− q′(v − s)
(1− q′)[(v − s)− δ(v −H)] (2)
(iii)
q =
[v −H](1− δ)
(v −M)− δ(v −H) (3)
(iv)
q
′
=
[v −H](1− δ)
(v − pl)− δ(v −H) (4)
Proof.
The above expressions are derived with the help of the indifference conditions of the
buyers. We relegate the formal proof to appendix (A).
We now show that there indeed exists a pl as described above. The following lemma does
this.
Lemma 2 There exists a unique pl ∈ (M,H), such that,
pl −M = δ(E(y)−M)
where E(y) is same as defined before.
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Proof.
Consider any x ∈ (M,H). Let F x1 (.), F x2 (.), qx, q′x, and Ex(y) be the expressions
obtained from F1(.), F2(.), q, q
′
and E(y) respectively by replacing pl by x. That is we
compute the distributions and the probabilities according to the above described strategy
profile by assuming pl = x.
All we now need to show is that there exists a unique x∗ ∈ (M,H) such that,
x∗ −M = δ(Ex∗(y)−M)
From our description given above, we can posit that Ex(y) ca be written as follows
Ex(y) = qx[q
′xM + (1− q′x)Ex2 (p)] + (1− qx)[q
′xEx1 (p)
+(1− q′x)E(highest offer)]
where, Exi (p) is derived from F
x
i (.), (i = 1, 2) and is the expected price offer by the buyer
Bi,when his offers are in the range [x,H].
We claim that as x increases by 1 unit, increase in Ex(y) is by less than 1 unit. See
appendix B for the proof of this claim.
Now we define the function G(.) as,
G(x) = x− [δEx(y) + (1− δ)M ]
Differentiating G(.) w.r.t x we get,
G
′
(x) = 1− (δ)∂E
x(y)
∂x
From our above claim we can infer that
G
′
(x) > 0
From the equilibrium strategies we know that M < Ex(y) < H for any x ∈ (M,H). Since
δ ∈ (0, 1) we have,
lim
x→M
G(x) < 0 and lim
x→H
G(x) > 0
Since G(.) is a continuous and monotonically increasing function, using the Intermediate
Value Theorem we can say that there exists a unique x∗ ∈ (M,H) such that,
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G(x∗) = 0
⇒ x∗ = δEx∗(y) + (1− δ)M
This x∗ is our required pl.
Thus we have,
G(pl) = 0
⇒ pl = (1− δ)M + δE(y)
2.2.2 Uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium outcome
In this section we will show that the outcome derived above is the unique stationary equilib-
rium outcome in this game, so that the expected payoff to each of the buyers is v −H3. By
outcome we mean the vector of payoffs obtained by the buyers and sellers. We will adopt
the methodology of Shaked and Sutton [18].
Let M∗ and m∗ be the maximum and the minimum payoffs4 obtained by a buyer in
any stationary equilibrium of the complete information game. Also let ΛH and ΛM be the
maximal stationary equilibrium payoffs for sellers SH and SM respectively.
The following lemma rules out the possibility of having each buyer offering to both the
sellers with positive probability.
Lemma 3 In any stationary equilibrium, when all four players are present, both buyers
cannot make offers to both sellers with positive probability.
Proof.
In a stationary equilibrium when both the buyers are offering to both the sellers, each
buyer should randomise its offer while offering to any of the sellers. Given the buyers’ be-
haviour, each seller accepts an offer(or the maximum of the received offers) if and only if the
payoff from acceptance is at least as large as the discounted continuation payoff from rejec-
tion. This implies that in a stationary equilibrium we need not worry about the deviations
by the sellers.
3In fact there is another stationary equilibrium where B2 offers to both the sellers with positive probability
and B1 to SM only. The qualitative nature will be the same and the buyer with valuation v obtains a payoff
of v −H.
This does not necessarily mean that the price is H. However, we shall show this is true asymptotically, as
δ → 1.
4We assume (without needing to) that the supremal and infimal payoffs are actually achieved.
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Let sMi be the upper bound of the support of offers to SM from the buyer Bi, i = 1, 2.
Let sHi be the upper bound of the support of offers to SH from the buyer Bi, i = 1, 2.
If sH1 6= sH2 then the buyer having a higher upper bound (say B1) can profitably deviate
by offering (s¯H1 − ) to SH , where  > 0 and s¯H1 −  > s¯H2 .
Thus ,
sH1 = s
H
2 = s
H
By similar reasoning we can say that,
sM1 = s
M
2 = s
M
Next we would argue that we must have sH = sM . Suppose not . W.L.O.G let sH > sM
. In this case one of the buyers can profitably deviate by offering p to SM such that s
H >
p > sM . Thus we have,
sH = sM = s
Let q2 be the probability with which B2 offers to SH . Let F
M
2 (.) and F
H
2 (.) be the
conditional distributions of offers by B2 given that he makes offers to SM and SH respectively.
Take s ∈ [sM1 , s]∩ [sH1 , s]. B1’s indifference (from making offer to SM or SH) relation tells us
that:
(v − s)[q2 + (1− q2)FM2 (s)] + (1− q2)(1− FM2 (s))δ(v −H)
= (v − s)[(1− q2) + q2FH2 (s)] + q2(1− FH2 (s))δ(v −M)
Since δ(v −M) 6= δ(v −H), (1− q2)(1− FM2 (s)) 6= q2(1− FH2 (s)). W.L.O.G we take,
(1− q2)(1− FM2 (s)) > q2(1− FH2 (s))
⇒ (1− q2)(1− FM2 (s)) > q2(1− FH2 (s))
The above inequality suggests that B2 puts a mass point at the upper bound of one of the
supports. If not then both (1 − q2)(1 − FM2 (s)) and q2(1 − FH2 (s)) are 0 and the above
inequality is not satisfied. This implies that B1 can profitably deviate.
Next we show that it is never the case that in a stationary equilibrium both buyers offer
to the seller with higher cost. This is described in the following lemma
Lemma 4 In any stationary equilibrium, when all four players are present, both buyers
cannot offer to SH with positive probability.
Proof.
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Clearly both offering to SH only is not possible in equilibrium. Similarly one of the
buyers offering to SH only and the other one making offers to both the sellers with positive
probability is not possible. In that case the buyer who is offering to both can profitably
deviate by offering M to SM . Thus if both are offering to SH it must be the case that both
are making offers to both the sellers with positive probability. From lemma 3 we know that
this is not possible in a stationary equilibrium. This concludes the proof.
Hence in stationary equilibrium it must be the case that only one buyer makes offer to
the seller with higher cost (SH). With the help of the previous two lemmas, we will now
show in the following lemma that the seller with cost H can never obtain a strictly positive
payoff in a stationary equilibrium.
Lemma 5 In any stationary equilibrium, the seller with a higher valuation (i.e SH) never
gets an offer which is strictly greater than H. Thus ΛH = 0
Proof.
Suppose not. That is let it be the case that in a particular stationary equilibrium SH
obtains a strictly positive payoff (ΛH > 0). From Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 we know that
a single buyer is making this offer to SH . Since ΛH > 0, this buyer is offering xH (where
xH ≥ H + ΛH) with positive probability and his payoff is less than or equal to v − xH .
Suppose this buyer deviates and makes an offer of x
′
H such that,
x
′
H = H + ΛH
where 0 < δ <  < 1.
This offer will always be accepted by SH , irrespective of what the other seller’s strategy
is. This is because if she rejects this offer then next period she can at most obtain a payoff
of ΛH which is worth δΛH now. However by accepting this offer she gets ΛH > δΛH .
Since,
xH − x′H ≥ H + ΛH −H − ΛH
= ΛH(1− ) > 0,
this deviation is profitable for the buyer. Thus we must have ΛH = 0 . Fom this we infer
that in a stationary equilibrium SH never gets an offer greater than H.
Thus in any stationary equilibrium, SH always gets a payoff of zero. The following lemma
describes that the price offer to SM is bounded above by H.
Lemma 6 In a stationary equilibrium, SM cannot get an offer greater than H with positive
probability.
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Proof.
Suppose SM gets an offer H +4,4 > 0 with positive probability. From lemma (5) we
know that H never gets an offer greater than H in equilibrium. Thus the buyer making the
above offer to M can profitably deviate by offering H + λ4, (0 < λ < 1) to SH . Thus in
equilibrium SM cannot get an offer greater than H with positive probability.
We now show that m∗ = M∗. This is described by the following two lemmas. ([18]).
Lemma 7 The minimum payoff obtained by a buyer in a stationary equilibrium is bounded
below by v −H. Thus
m∗ ≥ v −H for i = 1, 2
Proof.
From Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 we can posit that none of the sellers gets any offer greater
than H with positive probability. Thus in a stationary equilibrium buyers’ offers are always
in the interval [M,H]. Hence m∗ is bounded below by v −H. This proves that
m∗ ≥ v −H
Lemma 8 The maximum payoff obtained by a buyer in a stationary equilibrium is bounded
above by v −H. Thus
M∗ ≤ v −H for i = 1, 2
Proof.
Suppose there exists a stationary equilibrium such that Bi obtains a payoff of M
∗ such
that M∗ > v −H.
(i) Consider the situation when the buyers play pure strategies. It must be true that the
offer made by Bi is accepted. Let p
∗ be the equilibrium price offer by Bi. Since,
M∗ = v − p∗ > v −H
we have,
p∗ < H
This implies that this offer is accepted by seller SM .
Thus either Bj (j 6= i) is offering to SH or it is offering a price lower than p∗ to SM . In
both cases Bj can profitably deviate by offering a price p to SM such that p
∗ < p < H .
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Hence it is not possible for Bi to obtain a payoff of M
∗ > v−H in a stationary equilibrium
when both buyers play pure strategies.
(ii) Suppose at least one of the buyers plays a non-degenerate mixed strategy. It is easy
to note that Bi cannot obtain a payoff of M
∗ > v − H, if he offers to SH with positive
probability. Thus we only need to consider the situations when Bi is offering to SM only.
Suppose both B1 and B2 are offering to SM only. There does not exist a stationary
equilibrium where one of the buyers plays a pure strategy. Thus both B1 and B2 play mixed
strategies. It is trivial to check that in equilibrium the supports of their offers have to be
the same. Let [s, s] be the common support of their offers, where s ≥ M . Since Bi obtains
a payoff higher than v −H we must have s < H. Let Fj(.) be the distribution 5 of offers by
Bj, where j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Thus for any s ∈ [s, s] buyer Bi’s indifference relation gives us
(v − s)Fj(s) + (1− Fj(s))δ(v −H) = M∗
⇒ Fj(s) = M
∗ − δ(v −H)
(v − s)− δ(v −H)
Since Fj(s) is always positive, Bj puts a mass point at s. From lemma 7, we know that
m∗ ≥ v−H. Thus by applying similar reasoning we can show that Bi also puts a mass point
at s.
We will now show that Bi can profitably deviate. Suppose Bi shifts the mass from s to
s+  where  > 0 and  is arbitrarily small. The change in payoff of Bi is given by,
4 = Fj(s+ )(v − (s+ ))− Fj(s)
2
(v − s) (5)
We will show that for small values of  the above change in payoff is positive. For  > 0,
from ( 5) we have,
4 = [Fj(s) + F ′j (x)](v − (s+ ))−
Fj(s)
2
(v − s)
where x ∈ (s, ).
This implies
4 = Fj(s)(v − s) + F ′j (x)(v − s)− Fj(s)− 2F
′
j (x)−
Fj(s)
2
(v − s)
= Fj(s)(
v − s
2
− ) + F ′j (x)(v − s)− 2F
′
j (x)
5We assume that Fj(.) is differentiable
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Since  is arbitraily small, we have 2F
′
j (x) ≈ 0.
Thus 4 = Fj(s)(v − s
2
− ) + F ′j (x)(v − s) > 0
This shows that Bi has a profitable deviation.
Next, consider the case when Bi offers to SM and Bj offers to SH . If Bi is playing a pure
strategy then his offer must be less than H. If Bi is playing a mixed strategy then the upper
bound of the support must be less than H. In both cases Bj can profitably deviate.
Lastly, consider the case when Bi is offering to SM and Bj is offering to both the sellers.
If Bi obtains a payoff of M
∗ > v − H then the upper bound of the support of his offers
must be less than H. Since the other buyer is offering to SH , his payoff is bounded above
by v −H. This implies that Bj can profitably deviate.
Hence from the above arguments we can infer that,
M∗ ≤ v −H (6)
Proposition 2 The outcome implied by the asymmetric equilibrium of Proposition 1 is the
unique stationary equilibrium outcome of the basic game.
Proof. From Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 we have,
M∗ ≤ v −H ≤ m∗ (7)
By construction we have,
m∗ ≤M∗
This implies that,
M∗ = v −H = m∗
This concludes the proof.
2.2.3 Asymptotic characterisation
We now determine the limiting equilibrium outcome when the discount factor δ goes to 1.
From (3) we know that the probability with which the buyer B1 offers to SH is given by,
q =
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v −M)− δ(v −H) (8)
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From ( 8) it is clear that as δ → 1, q → 0.
From section 2.2.1 recall the equation,
G(x) = x− [δEx(y) + (1− δ)M ]
Since the fixed point x∗ is a function of δ, we denote it by x∗(δ).
The following lemma shows that the lower boun of price offer
Lemma 9 There exists a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that for any δ ∈ (δ∗, 1), the fixed point x∗(δ) is
always less than δH.
Proof.
We know that for any δ ∈ (0, 1), limx→H G(x) > 0.
Since the function G(x) is continuous and monotonically increasing in x, there exists a
δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that, G(δH) > 0 for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1). Thus for any δ ∈ (δ∗, 1), the fixed point
x∗(δ) is always less than δH.
Next, we show that as agents become patient enough, the probability with which the
buyer B2 offers M to SM , goes to zero. This is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 10 As δ → 1, q′ → 0.
Proof. We have,
q
′
=
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v − pl)− δ(v −H)
=
1
v
v−H +
δH−pl
(1−δ)(v−H)
where pl = x
∗(δ).
From Lemma 9 we have δH − pl > 0. Thus we have
q
′ → 0 as δ → 1
We will now show that as the discount factor goes to 1, the distributions of offers to SM
collapse. The following proposition shows this.
Proposition 3 As δ → 1, pl → H.
Proof.
The offers from B2 to SM in the range [pl, H], follows the distribution function
F2(s) =
(v −H)[1− δ(1− q′)]− q′(v − s)
(1− q′)[v − s− δ(v −H)]
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⇒ 1− F2(s) = H − s
(1− q′)[v − s− δ(v −H)]
.
Note that,
1− F2(H) = 0
From Lemma 10 we know that as δ → 1, q′ → 0. Thus as δ → 1, for s arbitrarily close
to H we have,
1− F2(s) ≈ H − s
H − s = 1
Thus the support of the distribution F2 collapses. This implies that as δ → 1 , pl → H.
This shows that as agents become patient enough, the unique stationary equilibrium
outcome of the basic complete information game implies that in presence of all players
both the buyers almost surely offer H to seller SM . Hence although trading takes place
through decentralised bilateral interactions, asymptotically we get a uniform price for a
non-differentiated good.
2.3 Possibility of other equilibria in the public offers case6
In the public offers model there is a possibility of other subgame perfect equilibria for high
values of δ. These equilibria can be constructed on the basis of the stationary equilibrium
described above. This is as follows.
1. Suppose in the beginning both the buyers offer p = M to SM .
2. SM accepts one offer by choosing each seller with probability
1
2
.
3. If any buyer offers slightly higher than p (but less than some p
′
as described below),
then SM rejects all offers and next period players revert to the stationary equilibrium.
4. If any of the buyer offer a price grater than or equal to p
′
, then the seller SM accepts
that price.
5. If both buyers offer p and SM rejects them, then next period buyers offer p to SM
again.
The equilibrium payoff to SM from accepting any of the equilibrium offer is 0. If buyers
stick to their equilibrium strategies and SM rejects an equilibrium offer then next period his
payoff is 0. Thus SM has no incentive to deviate.
On the other hand buyers’ equilibrium payoff is 1
2
(v−M)+ 1
2
δ(v−H). From the proposed
equilibrium strategies we know that if a buyer deviates then the continuation payoff to SM
by rejecting all offers is close to δ(H −M), since from the previous section we know that
6Asher Wolinsky directed our attention to this type of equilibrium, similar to constructions elsewhere in
the literature.
17
the payoff to SM from the stationary equilibrium approaches H −M as δ goes to 1. Hence
if a deviating buyer wants his offer to be accepted by SM then he must offer p
′
or higher to
her where p
′
= δH + (1 − δ)M . In that case his deviating payoff would be v − p′ , which is
strictly lower than 1
2
(v−M) + 1
2
δ(v−H) for high values of δ. If a buyer deviates by offering
slightly higher than M (i.e less than p
′
) then all offers are rejected by SM and next period he
obtains a payoff of v −H (which is worth δ(v −H) now). Thus he has no incentive to offer
something higher than M . Lastly observe that it is optimal for SM to reject all offers if some
buyer offers something higher than M(and less than p
′
). This is because his continuation
payoff from rejection will be higher than his payoff from acceptance.
We can get equilibria of this kind for all p ∈ [M, pl) when δ is close to 1.
As is usual in equilibria of this kind, a small change in a buyer’s equilibrium offer leads
to a large change in the expected continuation payoff for all players.
However, if an  (for arbitrary positive  ) deviation by a player from the proposed equi-
librium path is considered as a mistake, then there is no change in the expected continuation
payoff. In that case a buyer can profitably deviate by offering a price little above p to SM . If
this does not change the expected equilibrium path, SM accepts this offer with probability
1, the buyer deviation is profitable and this candidate equilibrium is destroyed. We feel
this argument has some validity, though a full formal development is outside the scope of
this paper (and similar arguments have been suggested earlier in different contexts by other
authors).
In the next section we do the analysis of the general case, i.e when there are n buyers
and n sellers, for some general finite n ≥ 3.
3 n buyers and n sellers, n ≥ 3
3.1 Players and payoffs
There are n buyers (n > 2 and n finite) and n sellers. Each buyer’s maximum willingness to
pay for a unit of an indivisible good is v. Each of the sellers owns one unit. Sellers differ in
their valuations. We denote seller Sj’s valuation (j = 1, ..., n) by uj where,
v > un > un−1 > ... > u2 > u1
The above inequality implies that any buyer has a positive benefit from trade with any of
the sellers. All players are risk neutral. Hence the expected payoffs obtained by the players
in any outcome of the game are identical to that in the basic model. For our notational
convenience, we re-label u1 = L and un = H.
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3.2 The extensive form
This is identical to the one in the basic complete information game. We consider the infinite
horizon, public and targeted offers game where the buyers simultaneously make offers and
each seller either accepts or rejects an offer directed towards her. Matched pairs leave the
game and the remaining players continue the bargaining game with the same protocol.
3.3 Equilibrium
We seek, as usual, to find stationary equilibria. Thus buyers’ offers at a particular time point
depend only on the set of players remaining and the sellers’ responses depend on the set of
players remaining and the offers made by the buyers. We first show that in any arbitrary
stationary equilibrium, as agents become patient, buyers’ payoff is unique and all price offers
converge to same value. Thereafter we construct one such equilibrium for the described
extensive form.
3.3.1 Uniqueness of the asymptotic stationary equilibrium payoff and prices.
For the basic two-buyer, two-seller game, we have demonstrated the uniqueness of the sta-
tionary equilibrium. Following the same method of proof would be difficult in the general
case because of the large number of special cases one would have to consider. We therefore
adopt a different route here and use the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium in the basic
two-by-two model to demonstrate that in any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, the
accepted price offer by any seller converges to H as δ → 1. Thus in the general case as well,
the buyers’ payoffs converge to the same value (v −H) as δ → 1. This payoff is “as if” the
price in all transactions were the same but, of course, this is not literally true since δ ∈ (0, 1).
We thus show that the asymptotic outcome implied by the particular stationary equilibrium
demonstrated is the unique asymptotic outcome obtained in any stationary equilibrium. The
following theorem demonstrates this result.
Theorem 1 In any stationary equilibrium of a game with n buyers and n sellers (n ≥ 3, n
finite), prices in all transactions converge to H as players become patient enough( δ → 1).
The above theorem directly follows from the uniqueness result of the 2-buyer, 2 seller
game of the basic model (proposition (2)) and iterating on the following proposition (propo-
sition 4).
Proposition 4 Let n ≥ 1. If for any m = 1, 2, ..., n; (n finite) it holds that in a game with
m buyers and m sellers accepted price offers converge to H for high values of δ, then this is
also the case with any stationary equilibrium of a game with n+ 1 buyers and n+ 1 sellers
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Proof.
Please refer to appendix (J)
Whilst the formal proof of the proposition is in the appendix, we give some intuition here
for the result. We start from the two buyers and two sellers case, where there is a unique
stationary equilibrium with the price going to H as δ → 1. Thus, if there are more sellers
and buyers, a seller knows that if she manages to stay in the game until there is only one
other seller left, namely the one with value H, she can expect to get a price close to H. If
discounting is small, she will only be willing earlier to accept prices close to H, because of
the “outside option” of waiting. This holds for all the other sellers. The buyers, on the other
hand, compete up the prices of the low-valued sellers and for them, the seller with value
H is an outside option. The prices for the low valued sellers therefore get bid up in earlier
periods to something close to H; as discounting goes to zero (δ → 1), this goes to H. Note
this argument requires stationarity because the expectations of future play are not affected
by the history of offers and counter-offers.
3.3.2 Characterisation of stationary equilibrium
We have shown that the asymptotic outcome of an arbitrary stationary equilibrium of the
described extensive form is unique. We now provide a characterisation of a stationary equi-
librium for the extensive form described. Since we start out with equal numbers of buyers
and sellers, any possible subgame will also have that. Depending on the parametric values
we can have three types of equilibria. However, as δ becomes greater than a threshold value,
there is only one type of equilibrium.
From the basic complete information game, for each i = 1, ..., n− 1, we calculate pi such
that,
pi = (1− δ)ui + δE(yi) (9)
where E(yi) is defined as the equilibrium expected maximum price offer which Si gets in the
four-player game with Si and Sn as the sellers and two buyers with valuation v.
7
For each i = 1, ..., n− 1 we define q¯i as,
q¯i =
H − pi
(v − pi)− δ(v −H) (10)
7Note that pi is given by the equilibrium of the appropriate four-player game, which has already been
described earlier. It can essentially be treated as an exogenously given function of the parameters of the
problem for the purposes of the n− player analysis.
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and qH as ,
qH =
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v − L)− δ(v −H) (11)
Let P = ∑i=1,..,n−1 q¯i. The following three propositions fully characterise the equilibrium
behavior in the present game8. In all of them, sellers’ strategies are as follows: (i) Sn accepts
any offer greater than or equal to H. (ii) Seller Si (i = 1, .., n − 1) accepts the highest
offer with a payoff from accepting at least as large as the expected continuation payoff from
rejecting it. The following theorem summarizes the equilibrium characterisations of the
extensive form defined.
Theorem 2 The equilibrium in the general case is given by the propositions (5), (6) and
(7). For δ close to 1 and n > 2, proposition (7) gives the relevant characterisation.
Proposition 5 If for δ ∈ (0, 1), P < 1 and 1−P > qH , then a stationary equilibrium is as
follows:
(i) Buyer B1 makes offers to S1 only. B1 puts a mass of q
′
1 at L and has a continuous
distribution of offers F1(.) with [p1, H] as the support. Bn makes offers to S1 with probability
q1. He randomises his offers to S1 with a probability distribution F
1
n(.) with [p1, H] as the
support. F 1n(.) puts a mass point at p1 and has an absolutely continuous part from p1 to H.
(ii) For i = 2, ..., n − 1, Bi makes offers to Si only. Bi’s offers to Si are randomised
with a distribution Fi(s). Fi(.) puts a mass point at pi and has an absolutely continuous part
from pi to H. Bn makes offers to Si (i = 2, .., n− 1) with probability qi = q¯i. Bn’s offers to
Si are randomised by an absolutely continuous probability distribution F
i
n with [pi, H] as the
support.
(iii) Bn offers to Sn with probability q
H . He offers H to Sn.
(iv) In equilibrium, all buyers obtain an expected payoff of v −H.
The analytical details are in appendix D
Proof.
Please refer to appendix (D).
We now consider the case when P < 1 and 1− P < qH .
Proposition 6 If for a δ ∈ (0, 1) P < 1 and 1 − P < qH , then a stationary equilibrium is
as follows:
(i) For i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1, buyer Bi makes offers to Si only. Bi’s offers to Si are random
with a distribution Fi(s). Fi(.) puts a mass point at pi and has an absolutely continuous part
8Note that all quantities used in these propositions are defined with respect to the exogenously given
parameters of the game.
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from pi to H. Bn makes offers to Si (i = 1, .., n− 1) with probability qi = q¯i. Bn’s offers to
Si are random with an absolutely continuous probability distribution F
i
n with [pi, H] as the
support.
(ii) Bn offers to Sn with probability qn = 1− P. He offers H to Sn.
(iii) In equilibrium, all buyers obtain an expected payoff of v −H.
The analytical details are in appendix E
Proof.
Please refer to appendix (E)
Finally we consider the case when P > 1.
Proposition 7 If P ≥ 1, then a stationary equilibrium is as follows:
For i = 1, .., n−1, buyer Bi makes offers to seller Si only. Bi’s offers to Si are randomised
using a distribution function Fi(.), with [pi, p¯] as the support. The distribution Fi(.) puts a
mass point at pi and has an absolutely continuous part from pi to p¯. Buyer Bn offers to
all sellers except Sn. Bn’s offers to Si (i = 1, ..n − 1) are randomised with a continuous
probability distribution F in. The support of offers is [pi, p¯]. The probability with which Bn
offers to Si (i = 1, .., n− 1) is qi. If P = 1 then p¯ = H. If P > 1 then p¯ < H and as δ → 1,
p¯→ H. In equilibrium, all buyers obtain an expected payoff of v− p¯. The following relations
formally define the equilibrium:
Further if for δ = δ∗, P > 1 then for all δ > δ∗, P > 1 and p¯→ H as δ → 1.
The analytical details are in appendix F
Proof.
Please refer to appendix (F)
Proposition (7) tells us that as agents become patient enough, prices in all transactions
tend towards H.9. Note, from equation (10) and the definition of P, that for δ close to 1 and
n > 2, P ≥ 1. Therefore, proposition (7) is the appropriate case to consider for high enough
δ. The following observation can be made about the asymptotic result. For δ high enough,
the prices tend towards the valuation of the highest seller, independently of the distributions
of the valuations of the other sellers. Hence even if the distribution of the valuations of the
sellers Si (i = 1, ..n− 1) is heavily skewed towards L, the uniform asymptotic price will still
be H.
9We have seen earlier (in the 2×2 game analysis) that pi goes to H as δ → 1. In this propsition, we show
that p→ H as δ → 1. Thus the supports of the randomised strategies also collapse as δ → 1
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We conclude this section by providing a verbal description of the nature of the stationary
equilibrium described above.
It can be observed that in all of the above stationary equilibria(propositions 5, 6 and 7))
each buyer, other than Bn,is assigned to a seller to make offers to-buyer Bi to seller Si. The
remaining buyer (Bn) offers to all (or all but one) the sellers. This creates some competition
among the buyers, since each seller(except Sn) gets two offers with positive probability. The
probability qH is the probability with which Bn should offer to Sn in equilibrium if B1 puts
a mass point at u1(= L). The quantity q¯i is the probability with which Bn should offer to
Si in equilibrium, if Bi puts a mass point at pi and Bn offers to all the sellers. Further, in
any stationary equilibrium, a buyer who is assigned to a seller Sj has to put a mass point
either at uj or at pj. Hence, for a given δ, if Bn has to make offers to all the sellers then it
is necessary to have P < 1. Further if 1− P > qH , then it is possible to have the buyer B1
put a mass point at L; the equilibrium is then described by proposition (5). Otherwise the
equilibrium is described by proposition (6). On the other hand if P ≥ 1 it is not possible to
have Bn offering to all the sellers in equilibrium. In that case he offers to all but the highest
valued seller. The equilibrium is then described by proposition (7). In the 2 × 2 case, the
conditions P < 1 and 1 − P > qH are satisfied for all values of δ ∈ (0, 1). This is because
in the 2× 2 case P = H−pl
(v−pl)−δ(v−H) , which is less than 1 for all values of δ ∈ (0, 1). Further
1 − P = (v−H)(1−δ)
(v−pl)−δ(v−H) > q
H = (v−H)(1−δ)
(v−M)−δ(v−H) as pl > M . Hence the qualitative nature of the
equilibrium described in proposition (5) is identical to the one described in the basic model.
However for n > 2, the conditions satisfied by the 2 × 2 configuration need not hold for all
values of δ.
4 Extensions
In this section we consider possible extensions by having offers to be private, buyers being
heterogeneous and number of buyers being more than the number of sellers. An extension
of the basic model to ex-ante public offers is available in the Appendix.
4.1 Private Offers
In this subsection, we consider a variant of the extensive form of both the basic model (2
buyers-2 sellers) and the general model (n buyers-n sellers; n ≥ 3) by having offers to be
private. This means in each period a seller observes only the offer(s) she gets and a buyer
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does not know what and to whom offers are made by the other buyer(s).
Our equilibrium notion here will be public perfect equilibrium. The only public history
in each period is the set of players remaining in the game. Clearly in the private targeted
offers model, the response of a seller can condition only on her own offer. Hence, in the basic
model, the equilibrium of proposition 1 is a public perfect equilibrium of the game with
private targeted offers. Further, in proving this stationary equilibrium outcome to be unique
(proposition 2) we have never used the fact that each seller while responding observes the
other seller’s offer. Thus the same analysis will hold good in the private offers model. Hence
the outcome implied by the stationary equilibrium of proposition (1) is the unique public
perfect equilibrium outcome of the basic complete information game with private targeted
offers.
Next, consider the general model with n buyers and n sellers. In proposition (7), the
highest valued seller does not get any offer when all the players are present. Hence the
continuation game faced by a seller from rejection is always the same irrespective of whether
she gets one offer or two offers. A seller knows that by rejecting all the offer(s) she will face
a four-player game with Sn as the other seller and two buyers with valuation v. Thus the
seller Si,(i = 1, .., n− 1) knows the continuation game for sure and this does not require her
to observe the offers received by other sellers or the seller to whom buyer Bn is making his
offer. Since for high values of δ, P ≥ 1, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 With private offers, Proposition (7) describes a public perfect equilibrium of
the game for high values of δ.
Theorem (1) extends to the game with private offers with some minor modification of the
details10.
4.2 Heterogeneous buyers
Suppose, in the basic model, buyers too are heterogeneous. That is, buyer Bi has a valuation
of vi where,
v1 > v2 > H > M
Analysis of the basic model holds good. Next, consider a model with n heterogeneous
buyers and n heterogeneous sellers such that
10This is when in a stationary equilibrium all sellers get offers with positive probability. A seller Sk getting
only one offer does not know for sure the continuation game on rejection. Hence her minimum acceptable
price when she gets only one offer is always greater than her valuation uk.This is the only change in detail
of the proof of theorem 1. The rest of the proof holds good for private offers as well.
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vN > vN−1 > ... > v2 > v1 > H > uN−1 > .... > L
ui (i = 1, 2, .., n)is the valuation of seller Si with u1 = L and uN = H. vi (i = 1, 2, ..., n) is
the valuation of buyer Bi. An analogue of Theorem 2 holds in this case. The discussion is
in Appendix (H).
We conclude this subsection by providing an example to show that even if there is po-
tential of trade for both the sellers, such trades need not take place in the equilibrium of
our model. Suppose there are two buyers with valuation v1 and v2 and two sellers with
valuations H and M such that
M < v2 < H < v1
In equilibrium, both the buyers offer v2 to the seller with valuation M and the trade
takes place between the M -seller and the v1-buyer. (If, in equilibrium, the v2 buyer were
concluding the trade with positive probability, the v1 buyer would offer ε > 0 more and have
a profitable deviation.) Note that, in this case, any price between v2 and H would be a
competitive equilibrium in which the demand and supply would equate.
4.3 n buyers, n− 1 sellers
We now consider the case when there are more buyers than sellers. That is, there are n
buyers and n − 1 sellers such that n ≥ 2. Buyers are homogeneous and their common
valuation exceeds the valuation of the highest valued seller. The extensive form of the game
is same as before.
For n = 2, the solution is quite trivial. Both buyers would compete for the only available
seller and hence they would pull up the equilibrium price to v, the common valuation of the
buyers.
Appendix (L) shows that for n > 2, we can construct a stationary equilibrium such
that when agents become patient, prices in all transactions converge to a single value v, the
common valuation of the buyers. Thus in the limit only the short side of the market gets
positive surplus. This is equivalent to the Walrasian outcome of the present setup.
5 Conclusion
This paper has considered a dynamic strategic matching and bargaining game, with the
feature that only one side of the market makes offers. Unlike other papers in the field, the
offers are made simultaneously to capture competition. We find that stationary equilibria
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give a single price asymptotically in all the transactions.
Previous work has shown that this conclusion is not true when buyers and sellers take it
in turns to make offers (a game of which the Rubinstein bargaining game is a special case).
Alternating offers with heterogeneity in valuations tends to drive valuations apart.
Other authors [6] have mentioned the difficulty of solving dynamic bargaining and match-
ing games with many players if there is heterogeneity of valuations on both sides, though
she was specifically concerned with alternating offers. This turns out mostly not to be an
issue for us.
One interesting heterogeneity would be to consider settings in which the value of buyer
i for seller j′s good is vij, as in the housing market. In this setting it seems appropriate to
assume that sellers’ valuations do not depend upon the identity of the potential buyers. This
is kept for future research, though it seems feasible that techniques similar to the ones used
in this paper would enable us to characterise equilibrium prices in such markets as well.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof proceeds as follows: We first show that F1(·), F2(.) as given are probability
distributions and have the desired properties. Next we show that q, q′ are in (0,1). Assuming
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pl is between M and H, we then show that the strategies are an equilibrium. In the lemma
(2), we show that there is a unique pl implied by all these conditions and it is between M
and H.
Since both buyers offer to SM , it is clear that in equilibrium the offers to SM from both
the buyers have to be randomised.
To begin with, we figure out the continuation payoff for SM from rejecting her offer(s).
Consider the case when rejecting an offer leads her to face a 2-player game next period. This
gives her a continuation payoff of zero.
When rejection leads SM to face a 4-player game next period, the continuation payoff
needs to be endogenously determined from the equilibrium strategies of the buyers. (Recall
y is the maximum price SM gets in equilibrium in the next period (a random variable this
period)). Thus if pl is the minimum acceptable price for SM in this situation, we must have,
pl −M = δ(E(y)−M)
⇒ pl = (1− δ)M + δ(E(y))
Given the buyers’ strategies, E(y) is given by,
E(y) = q[q
′
M + (1− q′)E2(p)] + (1− q)[q′E1(p) + (1− q′)E(highest offer)]
where E1(p) is the conditional expectation of B1’s offers given that he is offering to SM and
E2(p) is the conditional expectation of B2’s offers given that he is not offering M to SM .
Since, as per our proposed strategies, competition takes place for SM only, it is easy to
note that E(y) > M . The fact δ ∈ (0, 1) implies that we must have pl > M .
Consider the region [pl, H] first, where both B2 and B1( if he does make one to SM) make
an offer. In equilibrium both buyers must be indifferent for all price offers in this region.
According to the proposed strategies the support of B1’s offer to SM is [pl, H]. Also we
know that B1 in equilibrium can obtain a payoff of v − H by offering H to SH . Hence for
any s ∈ (pl, H] we should have the following indifference relation:
(v − s)[q′ + (1− q′)F2(s)] + (1− q′)(1− F2(s))[δ(v −H)] = v −H
, which gives us,
F2(s) =
(v −H)(1− δ(1− q′))− q′(v − s)
(1− q′)[(v − s)− δ(v −H)]
as per ( 2).
As stated earlier, pl is the minimum acceptable price for SM , when on rejection she faces
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a 4-player game next period. This implies that on the equilibrium path pl is the minimum
acceptable price for SM when she gets two offers. Thus B1’s offer of pl to SM is accepted
only when B2 offers M to SM . Hence for s = pl, B1’s indifference relation is,
(v − pl)[q′ ] + (1− q′)[δ(v −H)] = v −H
which implies,
q
′
=
[v −H](1− δ)
(v − pl)− δ(v −H)
as per (4).
Since H > pl, from ( 4) we have,
q
′
=
[v −H](1− δ)
(v − pl)− δ(v −H) <
[v −H](1− δ)
[v −H](1− δ) = 1
This implies that q
′ ∈ (0, 1).
For F2(.) to be a distribution function as conjectured, we must have F2(H) = 1 and
F2(Pl) = 0. From 2 we have,
1− F2(s) = H − s
(1− q′)[(v − s)− δ(v −H)]
From (4) we can infer that,
1− F2(pl) = H − pl
(1− q′)[(v − pl)− δ(v −H)] =
(1− q′)
(1− q′) = 1
and 1−F2(H) = 0. Thus we have F2(H) = 1 and F2(pl) = 0. Hence F2 has the conjectured
properties .
Now consider the behavior of B2 in the selected region. Since B2 can obtain a payoff of
v −H by offering H to SM , for any s ∈ [pl, H] we should have,
(v − s)[q + (1− q)F1(s)] + (1− q)(1− F1(s))[δ(v −H)] = v −H
which gives us (1).
Next, consider other regions. According to the conjectured equilibrium strategies, B2
offers M to SM with probability q
′
(i.e, he puts a mass point at M). Also B1 offers H to
Sh with probability q. At equilibrium B2 should be indifferent for all price offers he makes.
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Therefore we should have,
(v −M)q + (1− q)δ(v −H) = v −H
which gives us (3). Since H > M , from ( 3) we have,
q =
[v −H](1− δ)
(v −M)− δ(v −H) <
[v −H](1− δ)
[v −H](1− δ) = 1
This implies that q ∈ (0, 1).
For F1 to satisfy the conjectured properties we should have F1(pl) > 0(since B1 puts a
mass point at pl while offering to SM) and F1(H) = 1. From ( 1) and ( 3) we have,
1− F1(pl) = H − pl
(1− q)[(v − pl)− δ(v −H)]
=
(1− q′)
(1− q)
Since pl > M , q > q
′
. Thus
(1− q′)
(1− q) < 1 (12)
From (12) we can infer that,
1− F1(pl) < 1⇒ F1(pl) > 0
Also it is easy to note that 1 − F1(H) = 0. Hence F1(H) = 1.Thus F1(.) satisfies the
conjectured properties.
Lastly, to conclude the proof it needs to be verified that above specified strategies con-
stitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. We use the one deviation property to do this.
Consider the sellers first. Since we are considering public offers, a seller’s history consti-
tutes the set of players, the offer she receives and the other seller’s received offer(s). On the
equilibrium path there are only two possible histories. One has all the players present with
both sellers getting equilibrium offers. The other one is when only two players are present
and an equilibrium offer is made. It is easy to observe that in the two-player game no seller
has a profitable one-shot deviation. This is because offers are one sided. Thus we need to
verify equilibrium for the 4-player game only. In the 4-player game irrespective of SM ’s offer,
it is always optimal for SH to accept any offer greater than or equal to H. If she rejects then
next period period either she will face a 4-player game or a 2-player game. In either case,
given that other players adhere to their equilibrium strategies the maximum payoff which
30
SH can obtain is 0. Also SH has no incentive to accept any offer less than H, (which gives
her a negative payoff), as she can always guarantee a zero payoff by rejecting the offer.
Next let us look at the possible one-shot deviations for SM on the equilibrium path.
Suppose in the event when she gets two offers, she rejects an offer greater than or equal
to pl. Her continuation payoff would then be pl − M . This is less than or equal to the
payoff obtained by accepting the offer. Thus on the candidate equilibrium path there is no
profitable one-shot deviation by SM . Finally, the way we have specified SM ’s strategy, there
exists no profitable one shot deviations for SM for any off-path history.
Now consider the buyers. After any history there can be only two possible situations.
Either all the players are present or only one pair remains. Given other players’ strategies
and the one-deviation property it is easy to note that buyers cannot profitably deviate.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
B Proof of the claim that ∂E
x(y)
∂x < 1
We prove this in the following steps:
(i) From the expression obtained for q
′
we can say that q
′x is increasing in x.
(ii) Next we show that as we raise x by 1 unit, there is an increase in Ex2 (p) by less than
1 unit.
Increasing x by 1 unit means raising the lower bound of support of F x2 (.) by 1 unit. Thus
we need to show that
Ex+12 (p) < E
x
2 (p) + 1
Consider the distribution F˜ x2 (.) with [x+ 1, H + 1] as the support such that,
F˜ x2 (s) = F
x
2 (s− 1)
Let E˜x2 (p) be the expectation obtained under F˜
x
2 (s) . Thus,
E˜x2 (p) =
∫ H+1
x+1
s dF˜ x2 (s)
⇒ E˜x2 (p) = [
∫ H+1
x+1
(s− 1) dF˜ x2 (s)] + 1
= [
∫ H+1
x+1
(s− 1) dF x2 (s− 1)] + 1
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= [
∫ H
x
(s) dF x2 (s)] + 1
= Ex2 (p) + 1
F x+12 (p) is obtained from F˜
x
2 (s) by transferring the mass from the interval (H,H + 1] to
[x+ 1, H], i.e transferring mass from higher values to lower values. Thus it is clear that,
Ex+12 (p) < E˜
x
2 (p) = E
x
2 (p) + 1
By similar reasoning we can say that ,
Ex+11 (p) < E
x
1 (p) + 1
These imply that the increase in E(highest offer) following a unit increase in x is less
than 1.
Hence from the above arguments it follows that,
∂Ex(y)
∂x
< 1
C Proof of lemma 12
As before, define the function G(.) as,
G(x) = x− [δEx(y) + (1− δ)M ]
where Ex(y) is obtained from E(y) as before(i.e by replacing pl by x). Using lemma ?? we
can argue that G
′
(x) is monotonically increasing in x for x ∈ (p′l, H). Next, from the above
prescribed strategies it is easy to see that for any x ∈ (p′l, H),we have Ex(y) > p′l. Thus we
can infer that there exists a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that,
lim
x→p′l
G(x) = x− [δ∗Ex(y) + (1− δ∗)M ] = 0
Thus for any δ > δ∗, we have limx→p′l G(x) < 0. Also since for all x ∈ (p
′
l, H), E
x(y) < H,
we have limx→H G(x) > 0. Hence by applying the Intermediate Value Theorem we can infer
that there exists a unique x∗ ∈ (p′l, H) such that G(x∗) = 0. This x∗ is our required pl. Thus
32
there is a unique pl ∈ (p′l, H) such that for all δ > δ∗,
G(pl) = 0⇒ pl = δE(y) + (1− δ)M
D Analytical details and proof of Proposition 5
Analytical Details:
The distributions F1(.), F
1
n(.), q1 and q
′
1 are given by:
F1(s) =
(v −H)[1− δ(1− q′1)]− q′1(v − s)
(1− q′1)[(v − s)− δ(v −H)]
(13)
F 1n =
(v −H)[1− δq1]− (1− q1)(v − s)
q1[(v − s)− δ(v −H)] (14)
q
′
1 =
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v − p1)− δ(v −H) (15)
q1 = q¯1 + (1− P − qH) (16)
For i = 2, .., n− 1, Fi(.) and F in(.) are given by,
Fi =
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v − s)− δ(v −H) (17)
F in =
(v −H)[1− δqi]− (1− qi)(v − s)
qi[(v − s)− δ(v −H)] (18)
Proof:
Consider Buyer B1 first. He puts a mass point at L and his equilibrium payoff is v −H.
Since we are considering public offers, S1 will accept an offer of L only when Bn is offering
to Sn. This is because only in that contingency would the continuation payoff to S1 from
rejection be zero. Thus we must have,
(v − L)qH + (1− qH)δ(v −H) = v −H (19)
Solving for qH we get (11). Consider the region [p1, H], where both B1 and Bn make offers.
In equilibrium each buyer should be indifferent among all the points in the support. Thus
for s ∈ [p1, H], B1’s indifference relation is given by:
(v − s)[(1− q1) + q1F 1n(s)] + q1(1− F 1n(s))δ(v −H) = v −H
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Solving for F 1n(.) from the above relation we get (14). Similarly for s ∈ [p1, H], Bn’s indif-
ference relation from offering to S1 is,
(v − s)[q′1 + (1− q
′
1)F1(s)] + (1− q
′
1)(1− F1(s))δ(v −H) = v −H
Solving for F1(.) we get (13). Putting s = p1 in Bn’s indifference relation we get,
(v − s)q′1 + (1− q
′
1)δ(v −H) = v −H
which gives us (15). Note that from (14) and (10) we have,
1− F 1n(p1) =
H − p1
q1[(v − p1)− δ(v −H)] =
q¯1
q1
From (16) we know that q1 > q¯1. Hence we have 1−F 1n(p1) < 1 which implies that F 1n(p1) > 0.
This confirms our conjecture that Bn, while offering to S1 puts a mass point at p1. It is easy
to check that F 1n(H) = 1. Similarly from (13) and (15) we have,
1− F1(p1) = H − p1
(1− q′1)[(v − p1)− δ(v −H)]
=
(1− q′1)
(1− q′1)
= 1
which implies F1(p1) = 0. Again it is easy to observe that F1(H) = 1.
Next, consider buyer Bi, i = 2, ..., n− 1. Consider the region [pi, H], where both Bi and
Bn make offers. In equilibrium both buyers should be indifferent between any offers in the
region. For s ∈ [pi, H], Bn’s indifference relation is given by,
(v − s)[Fi(s)] + [1− Fi(s)]δ(v −H) = v −H
Solving for Fi(.) from above, we get (17). We can easily infer that Fi(pi) > 0 and Fi(H) = 1.
This confirms the conjecture that Bi puts a mass point at pi. Similarly, Bi’s indifference
relation is given by:
(v − s)[(1− qi) + qiF in(s)] + qi(1− F in(s))δ(v −H) = v −H
which gives us (18). Putting s = pi in Bi’s indifference relation we get qi =
v−pi
(v−pi)−δ(v−H) = q¯i.
Hence we have,
1− F in(pi) =
H − pi
qi[(v − pi)− δ(v −H)] =
qi
qi
= 1
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Thus F 1n(pi) = 0 and F
i
n(H) = 1. Also note that,∑
i=1,,,n−1
qi + q
H = q¯1 + (1− P − qH) +
∑
j=2,..,,n−1
q¯j + q
H = 1
Since uj > L for j > 1, from (19) we know that,
(v − uj)qH + (1− qH)δ(v −H) < v −H for j = 2, ...n− 1
Hence Bi (i = 2, ..., N) does not have any incentive to offer uj to seller Sj. Further, Bi
cannot obtain a payoff higher than v−H by deviating unilaterally and making offers to any
other sellers. Lastly, the way we have specified sellers’ strategies it is easy to check that none
of the sellers has a unilateral profitable deviation on the equilibrium path. This concludes
the proof.
E Analytical details and proof of Proposition 6
Analytical details: For i = 1.., n− 1, Fi(.) and F in(.) are given by,
Fi =
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v − s)− δ(v −H) (20)
F in =
(v −H)[1− δqi]− (1− qi)(v − s)
qi[(v − s)− δ(v −H)] (21)
Proof: This proof is identical in many respects to the proof of proposition (5). Consider
the region [pi, H],(i = 1, .., n − 1). In this region both Bi and Bn make offers with positive
probability. By considering the indifference relations of Bi and Bn in this region, we can get
(20) and (21) in the same manner as we obtained (17) and (18) in the proof of the previous
proposition. Similarly, we can infer that Fi(pi) > 0;Fi(H) = 1 and F
i
n(pi) = 0;F
i
n(H) = 1.
Since qn = 1− P < qH , from (19) we know that,
(v − L)qH + (1− qH)δ(v −H) = v −H and
(v − uj)qH + (1− qH)δ(v −H) < v −H
for all j = 2, .., n− 1. Since qn < qH , for all j = 1, ..n− 1 we have,
(v − uj)qn + (1− qn)δ(v −H) < v −H
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Hence Bi (i = 1, ..., n− 1) has no incentive to offer ui to seller Si. Finally note that,∑
i=1,..,n
qi =
∑
i=1,..,n−1
q¯i + (1− P) = 1
This concludes the proof.
F Analytical detail and proof of Proposition 7
Analytical Detail: For i = 1, ..., n− 1 we have
Fi(s) =
(v − p¯)− δ(v −H)
(v − s)− δ(v −H) (22)
F in =
(v −H)[1− δqi]− (1− qi)(v − s)
qi[(v − s)− δ(v −H)] (23)
qi =
p¯− pi
(v − pi)− δ(v −H) (24)
Proof:
Consider the region [pi, p¯] (i = 1, ..., n−1), where both the buyers Bi and Bn make offers.
Hence the indifference relation of Bn is given by,
(v − s)Fi(s) + (1− Fi(s))δ(v −H) = v − p¯
This gives us (22). One can easily figure out from (22) that Fi(pi) > 0 and Fi(p¯) = 1.
This confirms our conjecture that Bi(i = 1, .., n − 1) puts a mass point at pi. Buyer Bi’s
indifference relation is given by,
(v − s)[(1− qi) + qi(F in(s))] + qi(1− F in(s))δ(v −H) = v − p¯
Solving for F in(.) we get (23). By substituting s = pi in Bi’s indifference relation we get (24).
From (23)and (24) it is easy to see that F in(pi) = 0 and F
i
n(H) = 1. For consistency in the
expressions obtained we must have,∑
i=1,..,n−1
qi = 1⇒
∑
i=1,..,n−1
p¯− pi
(v − pi)− δ(v −H) = 1 (25)
From the hypothesis of the proposition we know that P ≥ 1. If P = 1, from (25) we have
p¯ = H. If P > 1, from (25) we can infer that p¯ < H.
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From the analysis of the basic complete information game we know that for each i =
1, ..., n − 1, H−pi
(v−pi)−δ(v−H) → 1 and pi → H as δ → 1. Thus if P > 1 for a particular
δ∗ ∈ (0, 1),11 it will be so for all δ > δ∗. Thus, the equilibrium behavior will remain the same
for all higher values of δ. Hence we can characterise the equilibrium for values of δ close to
one. Using (25) we have,
∑
i=1,..,n−1
(1− p¯− pi
(v − pi)− δ(v −H)) = n− 2⇒
∑
1,..,n−1
(v − p¯)− δ(v −H)
(v − pi)− δ(v −H) = n− 2
⇒ p¯ = v − (n− 2)[
∏
i=1,..,n−1[(v − pi)− δ(v −H)]∑
j=1,..n−1[
∏
k=1,..,n−1;k 6=j{(v − pk)− δ(v −H)}]
]− δ(v −H) (26)
From the basic model we know that for each i = 1, .., n − 1, pi → H as δ → 1. Hence
[(v − pi)− δ(v −H)]→ 0 as δ → 1. From (26) we have,
p¯ = v − [ n− 2∑
j=1,..n−1[
∏
k=1,..,n−1;k 6=j{(v−pk)−δ(v−H)}∏
i=1,..,n−1[(v−pi)−δ(v−H)] ]
]− δ(v −H)
As δ → 1, [ n−2∑
j=1,..n−1[
∏
k=1,..,n−1;k 6=j{(v−pk)−δ(v−H)}∏
i=1,..,n−1[(v−pi)−δ(v−H)] ]
]→ 0. Hence as δ → 1, p¯→ H. This concludes
the proof.
G Ex-ante public offers model
G.1 Ex ante public offers model
G.1.1 Players and payoffs
These are identical to those described in the basic model.
G.1.2 The extensive form
We consider an infinite horizon12 multi-person bargaining game. At each time point t = 1, 2...
offers are made by the buyers only. However the offers are not targeted. Instead each buyer
posts a price at which he is willing to purchase the good. Sellers can accept either of the
posted prices. If two sellers accept the price posted by the same buyer, the buyer selects
between them with equal probability. Also if a seller accepts a price and fails to sell his good,
all other offers expire. Matched pairs leave the game. The unmatched players move on to
11In fact, as δ increases we will eventually have P > 1
12Hoon-Sik Yang’s question in a seminar presentation prompted us to add this section; our thanks to him.
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the next period and the bargaining is continued under the same protocol. In this setting the
sellers can be compared to workers who sell their services and buyers can be compared to
firms who seek to purchase services from the workers.
G.1.3 Stationary equilibrium for ex ante public offers
We intend to find a stationary equilibrium of this (modified) extensive form. The qualitative
nature of the equilibrium, analogous to the one we have studied before, is as follows. One of
the buyers B1 randomises between posting a price of H and posting something less than H.
He randomises his prices if his posting is less than H. The other buyer B2’s posted price is
randomised along a support whose upper bound is H.
In order to describe the candidate equilibrium, we note that the two player game (one
buyer-one seller) is identical to that in the targeted offers model. We consider only the
four-player game. Consider the following strategies:
(a) One of the buyers, B1 say, puts a mass of q at H and a continuous distribution of
posts ( (1−q)F1(.)) from pl to H, where pl will be defined later. The conditional distribution
F1(.) consists of an absolutely continuous part from pl to H and a mass point at pl. B2,
on the other hand randomises his posts by putting a mass point at p
′
l and an absolutely
continuous part F2(.) from pl to H, with p
′
l < pl. The price p
′
l is defined as,
p
′
l =
M +H
2
(27)
The distributions Fi(.) will be explicitly calculated.
(b) The sellers’ strategies in the four-player game are as follows:
Suppose p1 and p2 are the posted prices such that M ≤ p1 ≤ p2 . If p2 ≥ H, then SM
accepts p1 (p2) if p1 ≥ M+p22 (p1 < M+p22 ). If p2 < H then SM accepts p2 only if the payoff
from accepting it is at least as large as the continuation payoff from rejecting it. SH accepts
p2 provided p2 ≥ H.
2. The expected payoff of a buyer i in equilibrium is v −H. The expected payoff of SH
is zero and that of SM is positive.
The following lemma explicitly calculates the equlibrium described above assuming its
existence.
Lemma 11 Suppose there exists pl ∈ (p′l, H) such that,
pl −M = δ(E(y)−M)
,where p (a random variable) represents the highest price post ≤ H under the proposed
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strategies. Then the proposed strategies constitute an equilibrium with,
(i)
F1(s) =
(v −H)(1− δ(1− q))− q(v − s)
(1− q)[(v − s)− δ(v −H)]
(ii)
F2(s) =
(v −H)(1− δ(1− q′))− q′(v − s)
(1− q′)[(v − s)− δ(v −H)]
(iii)
q =
[v −H](1− δ)
(v − p′l)− δ(v −H)
(iv)
q
′
=
[v −H](1− δ)
(v − pl)− δ(v −H)
Proof.
The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 1, if we replace M by p
′
l.
The next lemma states that for sufficiently high values of δ there exists a unique pl in
the open interval (p
′
l, H)
Lemma 12 There exists a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ > δ∗, there exists a unique pl ∈
(p
′
l, H) that satisfies,
pl = δE(y) + (1− δ)M
Proof.
Refer to appendix C
G.1.4 Asymptotic characterisation for ex ante public offers case
In the public offers model, as δ → 1, pl → H. Thus as agents become patient enough we get
a uniform price for the non-differentiated goods. Since the proof of this is almost identical
to the proof of Propositio 3 we omit it.
Note that the different versions of the extensive form give similar equilibria and the same
asymptotic result, provided offers are one-sided
H n buyers and n sellers, buyers are heterogeneous
Heterogeneous buyers: Suppose the buyers are heterogeneous such that,
vN > vN−1 > ... > v2 > v1 > H > uN−1 > ... > L
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For each i = 1, ..n− 1, define
phi = (1− δ)ui + δE(yhi )and
q¯hi =
H − phi
(vi − phi )− δ(vhi −H)
, where E(yhi ) is defined as the equilibrium expected maximum price offer that Si gets in the
four-player game with Si and Sn as the sellers and two buyers with valuation vi and vn. As
before, let Ph =
∑
i=1,..,n−1 q¯
h
i . Define q
H
h =
(v1−H)(1−δ)
(v1−L)−δ(v1−H) ≡ qH as v1 = v.
Proposition 8 With heterogeneous buyer valuations, analogues to propositions 5, 6 and 7
hold good for Ph < 1 and 1−Ph > qH , Ph < 1 and 1−Ph < qH and Ph ≥ 1 respectively. For
Ph < 1 and 1−Ph > qH the lowest-valued buyer with valuation v offers to S1. The specifics,
however, are slightly different(see appendix (I)). Also with private offers, proposition (7)
describes the equilibrium for high values of δ.
Remark 1 We omit the formal proof of the results for heterogeneous buyers since this is
very similar to those of the previous propositions. Here, we explain why in the case of
Ph < 1 and 1 − Ph > qH the lowest-valued buyer with valuation v offers to S1, rather
than one of the others.13 In equilibrium, the buyer who is making offers to S1 puts a mass
point at the reservation value of that seller (i.e. at L). Since the buyer is indifferent between
offering L to S1 and making randomised offers in the range [p1, H], the probability (q
H) with
which the buyer Bn makes offers to Sn must just make B1 indifferent among the offers in
the support of his randomised strategy.14 This gives qH as below.
(v − L)qH + (1− qH)δ(v −H) = v −H
⇒ qH = (v −H)(1− δ)
(v − L)− δ(v −H)
Buyer Bj (j 6= 1; j 6= n) makes randomised offers to the seller Sj with [pj, H] as the
support. First, it is easy to see that Bj cannot profitably deviate by making offers to Sk
(j 6= k 6= n) in the range [pk, H]. To ensure that the proposed strategies constitute an
equilibrium we need to show that this buyer with valuation vj( 6= v), has no incentive to offer
ui(or in the range (ui,pi) ) to Si, i = 1, .., n−1;. First consider i = 2, ..n−1. Since offers are
public15, a seller with valuation ui will only accept an offer of ui (or something in the range
13This is a sufficient condition for the strategies described to be an equilibrium.
14W.L.O.G we assume that v1 = v
15Note that the equilibrium for private offers is described by a different proposition.
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(ui,pi)) if the buyer Bn makes an offer to Sn. Hence, the payoff to the buyer with valuation
vj of making an offer of ui to Si is,
(vj − ui)qH + (1− qH)δ(vj −H)
Define qHj such that, (vj−ui)qH+(1−qH)δ(vj−H) = vj−H. This implies qHj = (vj−H)(1−δ)(vj−ui)−δ(vj−H)
. Since vj > v for all j 6= 1 and ui > L, for all i 6= 1 we have
qHj =
(vj −H)(1− δ)
(vj − ui)− δ(vj −H) >
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v − L)− δ(v −H) = q
H
Since (vj − ui) > δ(vj −H), (vj − ui)qH + (1 − qH)δ(vj −H) < (vj −H). The equilibrium
payoff to the buyer with valuation vj is (vj−H). This implies that the buyer has no incentive
to offer ui to seller Si. This also proves that for i = 1, the buyer Bj has no incentive to
offer L to S1. To see this note that
(vj−H)(1−δ)
(vj−L)−δ(vj−H) >
(v−H)(1−δ)
(v−L)−δ(v−H) . Since B1 is also offering L
to S1 with some positive probability the payoff to Bj by offering L to S1 is strictly less than
(vj − L)qH + (1 − qH)δ(vj − H) < vj − H. Hence Bj has no incentive to offer anything in
the range [ui, pi) to Si (i = 1, ..n− 1).
I Details of the equilibria defined in proposition (8)
We give here a more detailed description of the equilibrium for heterogeneous buyers for the
n× n model.
I.1 Ph < 1 and 1− Ph > qH
Buyer Bi (i = 1, .., n− 1) offers to seller Si only. B1 while making offers to S1 puts a mass
of q
′h
1 at L. With probability (1 − q′h1 ) he randomises his offers to S1 using a continuous
probability(conditional) distribution function F h1 with [p
h
1 , H] as the support. Bn offers to
S1 with probability q
h
1 . His offers are randomised using a probability distribution function
F 1nh with [p
h
1 , H] as the support. F
1
nh puts a mass point at p
h
i . The distributions F
h
1 , F
1
nh and
the probabilities qh1 and q
′h
1 are given by:
F h1 =
(vn −H)[1− δ(1− q′h1 )]− q′h1 (vn − s)
(1− q′h1 )[(vn − s)− δ(vn −H)]
F 1nh =
(v −H)[1− δqh1 ]− (1− qh1 )(v − s)
qh1 [(v − s)− δ(v −H)]
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q
′h
1 =
(vn −H)(1− δ)
(vn − ph1)− δ(vn −H)
qh1 = q¯
h
1 + (1− Ph − qH)
For i = 2, .., n − 1, Bi’s offers to Si are randomised with a distribution F hi (s). F hi (.) puts
a mass point at phi and has an absolutely continuous part from p
h
i to H. Bn makes offers
to Si(i = 2, .., n − 1) with probability qhi = q¯hi . Bn’s offers to Si are randomised using
an absolutely continuous probability distribution F inh with [p
h
i , H] as the support. For i =
2, ..., n− 1, F hi (.), F inh(.) are given by,
F hi =
(vn −H)(1− δ)
(vn − s)− δ(vn −H)
F inh =
(vi −H)[1− δqhi ]− (1− qhi )(vi − s)
qhi [(vi − s)− δ(vi −H)]
Bn offers to Sn with probability q
H . He offers H to Sn.
I.2 Ph < 1 and 1− Ph < qH
Buyer Bi (i = 1, .., n − 1) offers to seller Si only. Bi’s offers to Si are random with a
distribution F hi (s). F
h
i (.) puts a mass point at p
h
i and has an absolutely continuous part
from phi to H. Bn makes offers to Si (i = 1, .., n − 1) with probability qhi = q¯hi . Bn’s offers
to Si are random with an absolutely continuous probability distribution F
i
nh with [p
h
i , H] as
the support. For i = 1, .., n− 1, F hi (.) and F inh(.) are given by
F hi =
(vn −H)(1− δ)
(vn − s)− δ(vn −H)
F inh =
(vi −H)[1− δqhi ]− (1− qhi )(vi − s)
qhi [(vi − s)− δ(vi −H)]
Bn offers to Sn with probability q
h
n = 1− Ph. He offers H to Sn.
I.3 Ph ≥ 1
Buyer Bi makes offers to seller Si only. Bi’s offers to Si are randomised using a distribution
function F hi (.) with [p
h
i , p¯
h] as the support. The distribution F hi (.) puts a mass point at p
h
i
and has an absolutely continuous part from phi to p¯
h. Buyer Bn makes offers to all sellers
except Sn. Bn’s offers to Si (i = 1, .., n − 1) are randomised with a continuous probability
distribution F inh. The support of offers is [p
h
i , p¯
h]. The probability with which Bn makes
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offers to Si is q
h
i . If Ph = 1 then p¯h = H. If Ph > 1 then p¯h < H and as δ → 1, p¯h → H.
F hi (.), F
i
nh and q
h
i are given by the following expressions:
F hi (s) =
(vn − p¯h)− δ(vn −H)
(vn − s)− δ(vn −H)
F inh =
(vi −H)[1− δqhi ]− (1− qhi )(vi −H)
qi[(vi − s)− δ(vi −H)]
qhi =
p¯h − phi
(vi − phi )− δ(vi −H)
J Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an arbitrary stationary equilibrium of the game with n+1 buyers and n+1 sellers.
First of all it is to be observed that in any stationary equilibrium the seller with valuation
H can never get offers from more than one buyers with positive probability. Refer to appendix
(K) for a formal proof of this claim.
There can be two situations. Either all sellers are getting an offer with positive probability
or at least one seller is not getting an offer with probability 1.
Case 1:Suppose all sellers are getting offers with positive probability:
This implies that the upper bound of the support of price offers to the sellers is H.
Further except for seller H, each seller in the considered equilibrium gets offers from at least
two buyers with positive probability. This is because if one of the sellers other than H is
getting offers from only one buyer then she must be getting an offer equal to her valuation.
This is not possible in equilibrium.
Also it is to be noted that in a stationary equilibrium it is never possible that at a time
point there are remaining buyers and sellers to be matched and the seller with valuation H
has already left. Suppose it is the case. Let the highest value seller remaining be H˜ < H.
Then from our hypothesis, the highest equilibrium price is H˜. Now consider the period
when the seller with valuation H had left. It must be the case that a buyer BH had offered
a price y ≥ H to this seller. Hence the payoff obtained by that buyer is less than or equal
v − y ≤ v −H. In this stationary equilibrium, the highest expected price offer to the seller
with valuation H˜ is H˜. Hence in equilibrium no buyer will offer more than H˜ to this seller.
Suppose the buyer BH deviates by offering to the seller with valuation H˜. Two things are
possible if this seller rejects this offer from the deviating buyer. Either next period the same
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set of sellers and buyers will be present or there will be fewer buyers and sellers with the
seller with valuation H being present. In the first case we know that the seller with valuation
H˜ will accept any offer greater than or equal to H˜ and in the latter case by our hypothesis
she will accept an offer of H − γ where γ > 0 and is arbitrarily small for high values of δ.
Since only one buyer can offer to the seller with valuation H in equilibrium, in either case
BH can profitably deviate by offering to the seller with valuation H˜.
Consider a seller Sk with valuation uk. At least two buyers are offering to this seller
with positive probability. Since all sellers are getting offers with positive probability, in any
stationary equilibrium there can be the following three possibilities:
(i) Sk is getting more than one offer but fewer than (n+ 1) offers: In such a case
rejection of all offers would lead to a continuation game with n1-buyers and n1 sellers with
2 ≤ n1 < n+ 1. Then by hypothesis, all price offers converge to H in the continuation game
when δ → 1. For high values of δ we can thus approximate the expected highest price offer to
Sk in the continuation game by a number H− , where → 0 as δ → 1. Hence the minimum
acceptable price offer this period should be at least as large as pk = [δ(H − ) + (1− δ)uk].
(ii) Sk gets one offer but some other seller gets more than one offers: In such a
situation again rejection of all offers would lead to a continuation game with n1-buyers and
n1 sellers with 2 ≤ n1 < n+ 1. Thus the minimum acceptable price offer this period should
be at least as large as pk = [δ(H − ) + (1− δ)uk].
(iii) Sk gets one offer and all other sellers also get one offer: In this situation
rejecting the offer would lead to a game with seller Sk and one buyer next period. Hence
the continuation payoff from rejection is 0 and thus the minimum acceptable price is uk.
(iv) Sk gets (n+ 1) offers: Rejection of all offers leads to a game with n+ 1-buyers and
n+ 1 sellers. Let p¯ be the minimum acceptable price to Sk in such a situation.
It is easy to note that
uk < p¯;uk < pk
Consider an arbitrary stationary equilibrium strategy profile.
First, suppose p¯ < pk.
We would first argue that it is never possible that in equilibrium all buyers will make
offers to Sk with probability 1. This actually follows from our proof of uniqueness of the
basic model with two buyers and two sellers. If such is the case then we can show that at
least two buyers would put a mass point at the lower bound of the support. This is not
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possible in equilibrium.
Claim 1 :
It is never a possibility that in equilibrium a buyer makes an offer s ∈ (uk, p¯) as a part
of his behavioural randomised strategy.
Proof of the claim : An offer s ∈ (uk, p¯) is accepted when Sk gets only one offer.
However if a buyer is offering something in this range and getting it accepted with positive
probability, then he could have still made that offer accepted with the same probability by
offering s− λ ∈ (uk, p¯). This is a profitable deviation and it is true for any s ∈ (uk, p¯). This
proves our claim.
Claim 2 :
It is never a possibility in equilibrium that two buyers put a mass point at p¯ as a part of
their behavioural randomised strategies.
Proof of the claim: Suppose the claim is false. Consider a buyer Bk who puts a mass
point at p¯. This offer can get accepted only when Sk gets (n + 1) offers and all other offers
are less than or equal to p¯. Since there is another buyer Bj who puts a mass point at p¯,
Bk can profitable deviate by shifting the mass from p¯ to p¯ + λ, λ arbitrarily small. This is
because by shifting the mass to p¯ + λ, the probability of acceptance gets an upward jump
but the payoff from acceptance remains the same. This proves our claim.
Since Sk is getting offers from two buyers with positive probability, there has to be a
distribution of randomised offers to Sk from each buyer. As all sellers are getting an offer
with positive probability, the upper bound of the support of the distribution is H. Hence
with positive probability an offer greater than or equal to pk is made to Sk.
Without loss of generality we can take pk to be the lowest offer greater than or equal to
pk. Consider a buyer who is making this offer. Let qk be the total probability that the offers
by all other buyers are less than pk. Since this buyer’s payoff is v − H (as offers are being
made to all sellers with positive probability) we have
(v − pk)qk + (1− qk)δ(v −H) = v −H
(By our hypothesis the continuation payoff of the buyer if his offer is rejected is δ(v −H).)
This gives us:
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qk =
(v −H)(1− δ)
(v − pk)− δ(v −H) =
1
v
v−H +
δH−pk
(1−δ)(v−H)
Since pk is bounded above by δH, as δ → 1, qk → 0..
If p¯ ≥ pk, then also we can show in the same way as above that the total mass put at uk
goes to zero as δ → 1.
Thus as δ goes to 1, the probability that all offers to Sk are less than pk goes to zero.
Hence the highest offer is always greater than or equal to pk.
Case 2: At least one seller is not getting an offer with probability 1:
First of all it is easy to note that if exactly one seller is not getting an offer with probability
1 in a stationary equilibrium, then this seller must be the seller with valuation H. Otherwise
the buyer who is making offer to the seller with valuation H can profitable deviate by making
offer to the seller who in equilibrium is not getting an offer with probability 1.
Consider a seller Sk with valuation uk < H who is getting an offer. If she gets j offers
(j = 1, 2, ..., n) then rejecting all offers would lead to a game with n1 buyers-n1 sellers next
period (2 ≤ n1 < n+1). This is because at least one of the sellers is not getting an offer. Then
by hypothesis, the minimum acceptable price in this case would be pk = δ(H−)+(1−δ)uk.
If Sk gets n+1 offers then rejection of all offers would lead to a game with n+1 buyers-n+1
sellers next period. Let p¯ be the minimum acceptable price. Suppose p¯ < pk. In equilibrium
thus all offers are at least as large as p¯. In equilibrium all buyers cannot put a mass at p¯.
Hence at least one buyer while making offers to Sk should not put a mass point at p¯. In
that case no buyer should ever put a mass point at p¯. This is because an offer less than pk
is only accepted when the seller gets n+ 1 offers. However since at least one buyer is always
offering more than p¯, an offer of p¯ is always rejected. This is not possible in equilibrium.
We would now argue that there can never be a distribution of offers to Sk with the lower
bound of the support being less than pk and greater than p¯. Suppose it is the case and let sk
be the lower bound of the support with p¯ < sk < pk. Consider the buyer who makes offers in
the interval (sk, sk + τ) with positive probability where τ > 0 and is sufficiently small. Offers
in this range are almost surely (as τ → 0) rejected since all offers are almost surely greater
than the offers in this range and an offer in this range would only be accepted if the seller
gets n+ 1 offers. This is true for all sk < pk. Hence offers to Sk are at least as large as pk.
If pk ≤ p¯, then all price offers are always at least as large as pk.
Hence as δ → 1, price offers to Sk are almost surely greater than or equal to pk.
pk → H as δ → 1
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Thus we have shown that as δ → 1, the accepted price offer by any seller in a stationary
equilibrium with (n+ 1) buyers and (n+ 1) sellers converges to H.
This concludes the proof of this proposition.
K Seller with valuation H cannot get offer from more
than one buyers with positive probability
Suppose this is true. Then there exists a stationary equilibrium where at least two buyers
make offers with positive probability to the seller with valuation H. Let Bk and Bj be
two such buyers. Clearly there has to be a distribution of offers to the H seller with an
upper bound of the support s¯H > H. Thus equilibrium payoff to each of these buyers is
v − s¯H < v −H. Consider the following deviation by one of these buyers(say Bk). Suppose
Bk makes an unacceptable offer to H (H − e, e > 0) with probability 1. Then next period
according to our hypothesis his minimum payoff would be close to (v − H) for high values
of δ. This is because next period he will face a game which will have fewer than (n + 1)
sellers and buyers. Either seller H would be present or she would be not. According to
our hypothesis, for high values of δ the payoff to the buyer would be close to v −H in the
first case and strictly higher than v −H in the later case. Hence for high values of δ, Bk’s
payoff from deviation is at least as large as δ(v − H). For high values of δ we would have
δ(v −H) > v − s¯H . Thus it is a profitable deviation by the buyer. This proves the claim
L A Stationary equilibrium of the game with n buyers
and n− 1 sellers
We will derive a stationary equilibrium of this extensive form. Thus buyers’ offers at any
time point depend only on the set of players remaining and the sellers’ responses depend
only on the set of players remaining, and the offers. Before we describe the equilibrium
of this game formally we will verbally discuss its nature. In equilibrium, if all the players
are present, buyer Bi (i = 1, ..., n − 1) makes offers to Si only. His offers are randomised
using a distribution function function Fi(.), with [pi, p¯] (pi and p¯ will be defined later ) as
the support. Fi(.) puts a mass point at pi and has an absolutely continuous part from pi
to p¯. Buyer Bn makes offers to all the sellers with positive probability. Bn’s offers to Sj
(j = 1, .., n− 1) are randomised using a probability distribution F in(.). The support of offers
is [pi, p¯].
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For each i = 1, .., n− 1 we define pi as ,
pi = (1− δ)ui + δv (28)
Let qi be the probability with which Bn offers to seller Si. The following proposition now
formally defines the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 9 (i) The above conjectured strategies constitute a stationary equilibrium of
the present game with,
Fi(s) =
v − p¯
v − s (29)
F in(s) =
(v − p¯)− (1− qi)(v − s)
qi(v − s) (30)
qi =
p¯− pi
v − pi (31)
p¯ = v − (n− 2)
∏
i=1,..,n−1(v − pi)∑
j=1,..,n−1[
∏
k=1,..,n−1;k 6=j(v − pk)]
(32)
(ii) In equilibrium, each buyer obtains an expected payoff of (v − p¯).
Proof. First consider the buyer Bi, (i = 1, .., n− 1). For s ∈ [pi, p¯] his indifference relation
is,
(v − s)[(1− qi) + qiF in(s)] = v − p¯
Solving the above relation for F in(.) we get (30). Putting s = pi in Bi’s indifference relation
we obtain (31). It is easy to note that F in(pi) = 0 and F
i
n(p¯) = 1.
Next, consider the buyer Bn. The support of his offers to Si (i = 1, .., n − 1) is [pi, p¯].
For s ∈ [pi, p¯], Bn’s indifference relation is given by
(v − s)[Fi(s)] = v − p¯
which gives us (29). Note that Fi(pi) > 0 and Fi(p¯) = 1. This confirms our conjecture that
Bi puts a mass point at pi.
To have consistency in the expressions obtained we must have,
∑
i=1,..,n−1
qi = 1⇒
∑
i=1,..,n−1
(p¯− pi)
(v − pi) = 1
⇒
∑
i=1,..,n−1
(v − p¯)
(v − pi ) = n− 2
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Rearranging the terms in the above relation we get (32).
Now we should check that the strategies constitute an equilibrium. First, observe that
on the equilibrium path if a seller Si rejects her offer(s) then next period she will face a game
with two buyers and one seller. This will give her a discounted payoff of δ(v − ui). Hence
her minimum acceptable price should be pi. From the analysis of the basic model one can
infer that on the equilibrium path, there is no profitable deviation for the players. The way
we have specified sellers’ strategies these always constitute best responses in any off-path
contingency. It is easy to check that buyers’ strategies also constitute best responses in any
off-path contingency. This concludes the proof.
Remark 2 Note that irrespective of whether a seller gets one offer or two offers, the con-
tinuation game faced by her from rejection is the same. Hence the stationary equilibrium
constructed is a public perfect equilibrium for the case of private targeted offers.
From (28)it is easy to observe that pi → v as δ → 1. Thus as δ → 1, (v − pi) → 0 for
i = 1, .., n − 1. This implies that the second term in (32) goes to zero as δ tends to one.
Hence ,
p¯→ v as δ → 1
This implies that the distributions of the price offers by each buyer collapse to a single
value in the limit.
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